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"Some perplexity respecting the rights 'of the courts to pro-
nounce legislative acts vid, because contrary to the Constitution,
has arisen from an imagination that the doctrine would imply a
superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power," observed
Alexander Hamilton in a famed early apologetic for judicial re-
view.' "It is urged that the authority which can declare'the, acts
of another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose
acts are declared void."
At the time he wrote-the first book edition of The Federalist
had appeared in the spring of 1788 just prior to the final stae
acts of ratification of the new Constitution-Hamilton had only
the experience of the new state constitutions and the debates and
conjectures of the Philadelphia convention of 1787 upon which
to rely. The Federalist is thus one of the earliest theoretical ex-
positions on the federal Constitution; its enduring influence,
however, as John Marshall pointed out in 1821, derives in large
measure from "the part two of its authors [i.e., Hamilton and
James Madison] performed in framing the constitution," which
"put it very much in their power to explain the views with which
it was framed."2
In the matter of judicial review, the supporting arguments
which Hamilton put forth are perhaps less significant than the
fact that he took for granted the duty incumbent upon the courts
to apply a test of constitutionality to the acts of other branches of
government. In the same number of The Federalist, he went on
to observe:
*Professor of Legal History, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary.
1. THE FED ISr No. 78, at 100 (Bourne ed. 1942) (Hamilton).
2. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 US. (6 Wheat.) 264, 419 (1821). From 1788 to the
present, the publication of twenty-nine separate editions of these essays has at-
tested to their continuing usefulness in the study of the American constitutional
system. See, most recently, DIEZE, THE FEDERALisr: A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND
FREE GOVERNMENT, esp. chs. 1-3, 9 (1960).
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There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than
that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of
the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative.
act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny
this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his prin-
cipal; that the servant is above his master; that the representa-
tives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that
men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their
powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitu-
tional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they
put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may
be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where
it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Con-
stitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed; that the Constitu-
tion could intend to enable the representatives of the people to
substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far more ra-
tional to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an inter-
mediate body between the people and the legislature, in order,
among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned
to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper
and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact,
and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as
the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative
body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance be-
tween the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity
ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Consti-
tution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the
people to the intention of their agents.
Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of
the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the
power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will
of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to
that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought
to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought
to regulate their decisions by the fundimental laws, rather than
by those which are not fundamental.3
This basic assumption of constitutional theory in The Federal-
ist reflected the prevailing sentiment of the Philadelphia con-
vention itself. On August 15, 1787, Madison had moved-seconded
by James Wilson, a future Supreme Court justice-"that all acts
3. THE FEDERALIST, op cit. supra note 1, at 101-02.
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befoie they become laws should be submitted both to the Execu-
tive and.the Supreme Judiciary Departments;" and in discussing
the motion John Mercer of Maryland stated: "It is axiomatic
that the Judiciary ought to be separate from the Legislative: but
equally so that it ought to be independent of that department.
The true policy of the axiom is that legislative usurpation and op-
pression may be obviated."4 Madison's motion was one of a
number of instances in which a "revisionary function" was de-
bated in the course of the convention; in this instance (as in oth-
ers) the motion lost, but inasmuch as the question involved Ar-
ticle I Section 2 of the proposed Constitution, defining the right
of the respective houses of Congress to originate certain bills,
judicial review was not in issue., It is true that at this point in the
debates John Dickinson did protest that "no such power ought
to exist" in the courts; but, reported Madis6n, the speaker "was
. . . at a loss what expedient to substitute.""
No one, indeed, seriously challenged the principle throughout
the convention. Gouverneur Morris, opposing a proposition that
state laws be subjected to Congressional review, stated categori-
cally that any state law which had to be "negatived". would be so
disposed of by the courts.8 It was not how to curb or prohibit ju-
dicial review, but how to complement it with the "revisionary
power" vested jointly in the judiciary and an executive agency,
which was brought up recurrently. Several states, including New
York and Pennsylvania,7 had such agencies of review, reminiscent
of the powers vested in the royal governors' councils of pre-Revo-
lutionary periods. Other states, following the Virginia concept
of legislative supremacy and in reaction to the abuses of the royal
governor in council, strenuously opposed the "revisionary power,"
and in the process argued that judicial review was a sufficient safe-
guard against legislative usurpation. Thus Wilson, an advocate
of the power, argued that court review did not. go far enough.8
Luther Martin, in opposition, stated that "as to the constitution-
4. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 298 (rev. ed. 1937)
[hereinafter cited as Farrand].
5. Id. at 299.
6., Id. at 28.
7. Compare N. Y. CONsT'. art 3 (1777) in 5 THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTER, CONSTI-
TUTIONS, AND ORGANIC LAws 2628 (1909); and the analogous "council of censors"
provided in PA. CoNsT. § 47 (1776) in 5 THoRPE, op cit. supra at 3091. At the time
of its ratification of the federal Constitution, the New York convention proposed,
inter alia, an amendment providing for a commission to review judgments of the
Supreme Court. I ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONS'1ft1ION
8.F(2d ed. 1907).8. 2 FARRAND 73.
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ality of laws, that point will come before the judges in their
proper official character. In this character they have a negative
on the laws." To give them a "revisionary power" would be to
give them a double negative and they would thereafter lose the
confidence of the people "if they are employed in the task of
remonstrating against popular measures of the legislature."9 In
this perhaps fortuitous anticipation of the logical extreme of ju-
dicial review vis-a-vis legislative policy, Martin appears more per-
ceptive than George Mason, who supported the revisionary idea
by insisting that the judiciary had a duty to help in "preventing
every improper law."10
What the Founding Fathers thus said, in convention and in
the a priori propositions voiced in the course of the debate over
ratification, argues strongly for tie now general persuasion of stu-
dents that judicial review was indeed taken for granted in the new
structure of American federalism. The almost legendary Mar-
bury v. Madison" thus belatedly attains its proper perspective as
a strategic expression of the doctrine rather than its assertion de
novo. in the area of federal jurisprudence. Marshall himself, in-.
deed, in the debate over ratification in the Virginia convention
of 1788, demanded: "To what quarter will you look for protec-
tion from an infringement of the Constitution, if you will not
give the power to the judiciary? There is no other body that can
afford such a protection." In this context Marshall was speaking
to the question of the power of federal courts to prevent federal
encroachments upon the states; even more meaningful was his
observation at another point in the debate when he added: "Has
the government of the United States power to make laws on every
subject? ... Can they go beyond the delegated powers? If they
were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumer-
ated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of
the Constitution which they are to guard. They would not con-
sider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would
declare it void." (Emphasis Added).' 2
9. Id. at 76-77.
10. Id. at 78.
11. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). It is significant that none of the several pro-
posed amendments to curb the jurisdiction of the court, introduced in the period
of most vehement Congressional reaction to Marshall's opinion, sought to abridge
the fundamental power of judicial review. Cf. 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 68 (1806)
(1789-1824); 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 76, 216 (1807) [1789-1824]. Cf. also note 17 infra,
and, generally, ORPaitEI, AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1942).
12. 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE Ano'rION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 551, 553
(2d ed. 1907).
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The significant fact which emerges from this evidence is not
that judicial review was assumed from the outset in devising the
federal constitutional plan, but that the primary concern came to
be-then, and consistently throughout the national history-the
means of counterbalancing its effect. Montesquieu's classic for-
mula for democratic government, the separation of powers, was
the keynote of the constitutional theory of the Founding Fathers;
but the Philadelphia convention was dominated by the Virginia
principle of legislative supremacy which, in the final analysis,
meant that the powers of the tripartite structure of federalism
were (to modify a phrase which has since taken on another con-
notation) separate but not equal. The chief importance of Mar-
bury v. Madison thus appears not as the extension of judicial re-
view to all acts of government but as a device for establishing the
judiciary on a parity with the legislature. With Andrew JacJ -
son's later demonstration of the role of the executive branch
under the direction of a forceful President, separation of powers
at length became synonymous with equality and attained the prac-
tical equilibrium necessary to validate Montesquieu's theory."l
In any case, the basic issue of the early constitutional era was
how to subject judicial review-or, more properly, judicial doc-
trines enunciated by the courts in the process of decision-making-
to a reasonable degree of responsiveness to the popular will.
Then as now, three methods seemed obvious: (1) Congress could
enact laws defining limits to court jurisdiction in certain in-
stances-subject, however, to the interpretations placed upon these
very laws by the courts themselves. (2) The President could fill
court vacancies with individuals favorable to the prevailing pop-
ular view-assuming that it were possible to predict the behavior
of the individual once he came on the bench, an assumption which
history has disappointed more often than not. (3) Most definitive
of all was the amending of the Constitution itself, thus specifi-
cally altering the base upon which the unwanted judicial doctrine
had been erected.
This is a study of the third of these remedies, in which its ef-
fectiveness as well as its inadequacies-particularly for the present
age-will be considered. Of the twenty-two amendments to the
13. Cif. CoRwiN, DOCTmRNE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, chs. 1, 2 (1914); 3 BEVERIE, THE*'
LIFE OF JOHN MARSnALL, chs. 1-3 (1919); WHITE, Tm JACKSONIANS, chs. 1-8. (1954);
SCHLESINGER, AGE OF JACKSON, chs. 4, 8, 9, 25 (1945). The familiar argument that
Marbuiy v. Madison upset a balance of power rather than establishing one, is illus-
trated in HAiNEs, AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1932) and BoUDIN,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932).
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Constitution to date, at least three may properly be said to have
grown directly out of a-recognized need to nullify a fundamental
rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States, viz.:
(1) the Eleventh, offsetting the holding in Chisholm v. Georgia,14
which had confirmed the suability of states by private individu-
als; (2) the Thirteenth, rejecting the doctrine of the universality
of slavery as a property right established by Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford;15 and (3) the Sixteenth, making possible a federal income
tax in derogation of the rule in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co.10
The first and third of these, illustrating the use of the amend-
ment process to establish respectively, a state right and a federal
right, are the subjects of Parts H1 and III of this study.
That the amendment process readily suggests itself as a means
of offsetting judicial pronouncements is reflected in the literal tor-
rent of constitutional changes which have been proposed in Con-
gress in more than a century and a half.' 7 On the other hand,
the fact that only a microscopic number of such proposals have
ever been submitted for state action emphasizes the practical dif-.
ficulty of utilizing this method of reviewing judicial review.
Merely-that the proposals for amendment were made, however,
is some indication of the political sensitivity to certain specific
judicial holdings. Thus, the rule against state impairment of
contracts, originally laid down in the Dartmouth College Case,'
and relied upon in the Railroad Tax Case,'9 occasioned three dif-
ferent attempts in the 1880's to secure Congressional approval of
14. 2 U.S, (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
15. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). There is also a case for the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments as devices for reviewing judicial review. Cf., generally, 2
WARREN, SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HisroRY, chs. 20, 24 (1922), and see also
the Civil Rights Cases, 109 US. 3 (1885).
16. 157 U.S. 429, modified on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). For earlier efforts
at drafting an amendment following this ruling and prior to 1909, see Part III
infra.
17. An exhaustive study in 1896 reported a total of 1,756 amendments proposed
in Congress or via state legislative memorials during the first century after ratifica-
tion. Most of these (more than 90%., in fact) never got out of committee; many
were tabled as promptly as introduced, suggesting that, like many bills introduced
at every session of Congress, the proposals were often pro forma. See Ames, Pro-
posed Amendments to thle Constitution of the United States During the First Cen-
tury of Its History, 2 AM. HIST. A. REP. for 1896, passim (1897). The Ames study
has been continued in Musmanno, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution,
H.R. Doc. No: 551, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1929), covering the period from 1889 to
1928; and in Johnson and Hupman, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States Introduced in Congress from December 6, 1926 to January 3,1957, 5. Doc. No. 65. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
18. 17 US. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
19. 77 US. (10 Wall.) 511 (1871).
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a proposed overriding amendment. McCulloch v. Maryland0
caused the Pennsylvania legislature to memorialize Congress pro-
posing an amendment limiting the federal government's author-
ity to incorporate a national bank. The first Legal Tender Case2 l
brought a proposal in 1870 to make United States notes legal
tender; while the reversal of the judicial rule in a subsequent
opinion2 elicited a diametrically opposite proposal.
The reaction of Congress to key Supreme Court opinions has
been even more acute in the years since the coming of the New
Deal. The famous Schechter decision of May 27, 1935, invalidat-
ing the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195, produced a
rash of joint resolutions on proposed amendments. 24 Other pro-
posals on wages and hours,25 or on the proposition that the court
be required to submit certain rules to popular referendum, or to
Congressional review2 were advanced in subsequent Congresses.
The most recent decisions to excite a series of proposed consti-
tutional revisions, of course, have been the School Segregation
Cases.27
Occasionally, as it happens, the ideological orientation of the
court undergoes a change and an unpopular judicial rule is
reversed. Whether in these circumstances the threat of amend-
ment-e. g., the proposed women's minimum wage amendment
in 1924,-8 which was not adopted by Congress, or the child labor
amendment, which is discussed in Part IV of this study-in any
way affects the change in court thinking is a subject awaiting
(and probably defying) extended research.
However cumbersome the process may be, the use of the con-
stitutional amendment as the ultimate, supreme act of control of
a specific legal proposition has not received the study it deserves.
Of the amendments which are considered in Parts II and III
herein, the first is perhaps the most significant in terms of clari-
fying constitutional theory: i. e., it was the immediate result of
20. 17 US. (4 Wheat.) 516 (1819).
21. 75 US. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
22. Knox v. Lee, 79 US. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
23. On the proposed amendments for the foregoing cases, see Ames, op. cit. supra
note17, at 245, 256, 258.
24. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 US. 495 (1935); 79 CoNe. REc.
57, 7546, 8482 (1935).
25. 80 CoNG. Rzc. 1143, 8763 (1936).
26. Id. at 3202.
27. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 102 CONG REc. 1418, 3530,
3780 (1956).
28. 65 CoNG. RI c. 43, 315, 479 (1924); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S.
525 (1923), rev'd, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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the judicial opinion it was designed to overturn, and its drafting
was a dramatic confirmation of the fact that political leaders of
the early republic had tacitly recognized from the outset this
means of counterbalancing judicial review. If the Chisholm case
did not involve the same clearcut issue of the extent of court
power which was present in Marbury, it was in many ways the
essential counterpart of the latter case, establishing the power of
the courts to state a constitutional proposition on a subject on
which the Constitution itself might be silent.
II. AMENDMENT XI: ESTABLISHING A STATE RIGHT
One subject on which the Constitution was silent was the na-
ture of state sovereignty under the federal system which the Con-
stitution itself created. The Articles of Confederation had, of
course, been posited upon the supremacy of the states; in effect,
virtual total sovereignty was vested in the state members of the
parliamentary league which was the Congress under the Articles.
By the same token, the new government under the Constitution of
1787 was a sovereign agency in itself, albeit this sovereignty
obtained only in the areas of delegated power, as the states
somewhat plaintively tried to reiterate in the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.
James Wilson, early in the 1787 convention, had made the
Lockean point that, just as an individual, "naturally a sovereign
over himself," could not retain this total sovereignty "when he
becomes a member of a civil Government," so a sovereign state
yields an essential portion of its sovereignty "when it becomes a
member of a federal Government."29 This relatively simple prop-
osition was complicated immediately, however, by the question
of the relationship between the altered sovereignties both of the
individual and of the state in a federal system. Did a citizen of
the United States ipso facto acquire certain privileges by virtue
of the sovereignty of the federal power which were in derogation
of a sovereign prerogative formerly enjoyed by the state? Specifi-
cally, was the state reduced in sovereignty to the point where any
individual citizen of another state might sue it under. the federal
Constitution?
The convention had not settled this point. The Virginia plan
had proposed (on May 22) original jurisdiction for the Supreme
Court, inter alia, in "cases in which foreigners or citizens of other
29. 1 FARRAND 180.
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states applying to such jurisdictions may be interested."80 The
committee of the whole (on June 12) had amended this by strik-
ing the words "other states" and substituting the words "two dis-
tinct states in the Union."8 1 By August, the committee of detail
had rephrased the clause to describe "cases ...between a State
and citizens of another State," the final language of Article III
Section 2.2,
This language, of course, compounded the problem rather than
resolving it. Did the order of words assure that only states could
sue individuals and not vice versa? Hamilton, in a surprisingly
sweeping concession to the advocates of state sovereignty, flatly
stated that this was so:
It has been asserted that an assignment of the public securities of
one State to the citizens of another would enable them to prose-
cute that State in the federal courts for the amount of those secur-
ities; suggestion which the following consideration prove to Lie
without foundation.
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general
sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption,
as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the gov-
ernment of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a
surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it wil
remain with the States, and the danger intimated must be merely
ideal... The contracts between a nation and individuals are
only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pre-
tentions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action in-
dependent of the sovereign will.38
Long before John Marshall's rulings on the contract and com-
merce clauses, the Supreme Court of the United States was to re-
ject the Hamiltonian argument, and the states were to reinstate
it by constitutional amendment.
The issue was joined in the August term of the Supreme Court
in 1792, only three years after the new government had gone into
operation and one year after the ratification of the Bill of Rights,
30. Id. at 22. It is interesting to recall that this proposal was endorsed and intro-
duced by Randolph as a delegate from Virginia, when considering his argument as
attorneygneral of the United States, in 1793; cf. notes 38-40 infra.
31 1 Fr E 211.
32. 2 FAutRLM 186, 600.
33. Tin FEDERALSwr No. 81, at 125-26 (Bourne ed. 1942) (Hamilton). Chief Jus-
tice Jay specifically rejected this proposition in 1793; cf. note 45 infra. Both Mad-
ison and Marshall had assured the Virginia ratification convention in 1788 that
the clause was designed solely to aid states in actions against citizens of other states.
3 ELu OT, op. cit. supra note 12, at 533. 555.
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including the restatement of reserved powers in the Tenth
Amendment.34 Chisholm,-a citizen of South Carolina and the
executor of a former resident of Georgia, brought an original
suit in the Supreme Court of the United States to enforce a claim
against the state of Georgia. Earlier, in 1791, actions hadbeen
brought against the states of Maryland, New York and Virginia
by various creditors.8 5 Aghast at such developments, a committee
of the Virginia legislature in January, 1792, had'protested that
"the jurisdiction of the Court does not and cannot extend to this
case . . . and that the State cannot be made a defendant in the
said Court at the suit of any individual or individuals."86 At-
torney General Randolph was fully conscious of this pronounce-
ment from his own state when he moved for judgment against
the state of Georgia if the defendant failed to file an appearance
at the February, 1793, term. In December, 1792, the Georgia
house of representatives reacted vigorously, adopting a resolution
that this suit, "if acquiesced in by this State would not only in-
volve the same in numberless lawsuits ... but would effectually
destroy the retained sovereignty of the States."8 7
The Georgia house resolution apparently did not pass, but
neither did the state file an appearance at the February term of
the Supreme Court, although it did submit a written remon-
strance through Alexander J. Dallas and Jared Ingersoll of Phila-
delphia, denying the jurisdiction of the court. Randolph then
began his argument for judgment in favor of the plaintiff Chis-
holm. Striking immediately at the heart of the matter, the attor-
ney general conceded that the states were sovereign in areas not
•preempted by the federal sovereignty. But the federal power is
derived "immediately from the people," and vis-a-vis this federal
power the states "are in fact assemblages of these individuals
who are liable to process." 8 As for the jurisdiction of the court
in "controversies between a state and a citizen of another state,"
which the Georgia supporters insisted should be construed only
to mean the state as plaintiff, Randolph cited the Judiciary Act
34. Cf. Madison: "Interference with the power of the states was no constitu-
tional criterion of the power of Congress." 2 ANNAtS OF CONG. 1897 (1791) [1789-
1824].
35. 1 WARREN, op cit. supra note 15, at 91-92. The factual data on the back-
ground of this case are taken from Id. at 93 n. 1.
36. 1 WARREN, op cit. supra note 15, at 92.
37. AMES, STATE DocuMENTs ON FEDERAL RELATIONS 10 (1907).
38. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 423 (1793). Useful analyses of the
opinions in this case, as well as of the political. reaction, appear in 1 WARREN, op.
cst. supra note 35, at 91-102, and 1 HocKzrr, CONSTrrtTONAL HISeOre OF THE
LINITE STATES, 1776-1826, at 283-87 (1939).
REVIEWING JUDICIAL REVIEW
-of 1789,9 which relied on the preceding clause in Article III Sec-
tion 2, granting original jurisdiction in cases where "a state shall
be a party." When the controversy is between states, said Ran-
dolph, it is obvious that one of them must be a defendant. If
his first argument (on sovereignty) was to be relied upon, he
concluded, the state as an aggregation of its citizens could be-made
a defendant under the one clause as readily as under the other;
the clear intent of the Constitution, by this argument, was that
states should be suable by other states and by citizens of other
states.40
The state sovereignty advocates received comfort only from the
words of Iredell, who declined to find jurisdiction unless Con-
gress made it more specific in the judiciary statute.41 The other
justices unequivocably voiced the most sweeping restrictions upon
state sovereignty. States may not be sued without their consent in
their oiwn courts, said Blair; but "when a state, by adopting :the
Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of
the United States, she has, in that respect, given up her right of sov-
ereignty."'4 Wilson added the moral argument that a state wilfully
refusing to discharge a contract should not be permitted to take
refuge in a sovereignty which thwarted equal justice under federal
sovereignty. 8 Cushing considered, and rejected, the plea that states
could not be sued by citizens of other states when the United
States was not similarly suable; the sovereignty of the latter is
superior to that of the states: "Whatever power is deposited with
the Union . . . is so far a curtailing of the power and preroga-
tives of states." 44 Capping these opinions, Chief Justice Jay de-
fined a constitution as a compact between people and government;
by the federal constitution the people vested certain prerogatives
in the federal compact and removed them from the state com-
pacts. One of the essential prerogatives transferred insured equal
justice to all by making both states and individuals equally sub-
ject to federal jurisdiction on federal questions.45
39. Judiciary Act, § 13, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
40. 2 U.S. (2 Dail.) 419,426 (1793).
41, Id. at 433. See the refutation of Iredell's argument in Guthrie, The Eleventh
Article of Amendment, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 183 (1908).
42. 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419, 452 (1793). This rule was corroborated in United States
v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621,642-46 (1892).
43. 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419, 456; see also his denial of Georgia's claim of sovereign
immunity at 457.
44. Id. at 468-69. Marshall, C.J., accepted this principle in United States v.
Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 444 (1834). Its ultimate limitations were fixed by a
divided court (5-4) in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
45. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 471, 473, 477 (1793).
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The speed with which the state representatives in Congress re-
acted to this bold assertion of federal supremacy has perhaps been
unmatched in subsequent American history. The court's opin-
ions were handed down on February 18; two days later, a resolu-
tion for amendment was introduced in the Senate.4e This failed
of passage before the term expired, and a new resolution was in-
troduced at the first session of the Third Congress which had
passed both houses by March 4, 1794.47 In ratification, action was
equally swift; between New York's on March 27, 1794, and North
Carolina's on January 5, 1795, less than ten months were required
to secure the necessary approval of three-fourths of the then fif-
teen states. Although a formal announcement that the Eleventh
Amendment had become part-of the Constitution did not issue
from the Executive Departmept until January 8, 1798,'s the Su-
preme Court under Ellsworth was quite prepared to concede that
the amendment had reversed the rule in the Chisholm case: A
month after President Adams' proclamation, the court ruled that
it had no jurisdiction "in any case past or future in which a State
was sued by citizens of another State."'"
This did not end the matter, however. To have left the field so
completely to the state sovereignty party as the Hollingsworth
opinion did, would have been to encourage to a far greater degree
the amendment process as a means of legislative rejection of ju-
dicial pronouncements. The validity of the constitutional proc-
ess for altering the basis of the court's rule was dramatically
and unequivocably established by the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment; but, as Marshall was to demonstrate, the full effects
- of constitutional revision could be contained, to a certain degree,
46. 3 ANNAS OF CONG. 651-52, 656 (1793) [1789-1824). CI. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's reference to the "vehement speed" of Congressional action on this amend-
ment. in his dissenting opinion in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 US.
682, 708 (1949).
47. 4 ANNALs or CoNG, 30, 31, 477, 478 (1794) p1789-18241.
48. 1 MESAcEs & PAPERS O na PanmNTs 250 (1898). The Constitution does
not provide a specific method for declaring an amendment to be in effect; cf. US.
CoNsT. art 5 and the act submitting the amendment to the states, I Stat. 402. The
data given in WARREN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 101 n2 is erroneous; cf. 12 State
Dept. Press Releases 247 (1935). Warren can hardly be challenged, however, in
describing the promulgation of this amendment as 'extremely informal and care-
less." Formal procedure for certifying that an amendment has been ratified by the
required number of states is provided at present by the Act of Oct. 31, 1951, 1
U.S.C. § 106(b) (1958). However, the court has held that an amendment becomes
law upon the approval of the last state to constitute the three-fourth majority, ir-
respective of any action on the part of the Executive Department, Fairchild v.
Hughes, 258 US. 126 (1922).
49. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 US. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). Cf. the opinion of
Mr. Justice Bradley in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 US. 1,11 (1890); and that of Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 US. 313, 328 (1934).
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within subsequent interpretations of the amendment itself. The
Eleventh Amendment, ratified within a decade after the adop-
tion of the Constitution, reflected the still virulent resistance of
state sovereignty to national power. The swiftness of its ratifica-
tion was also an indication of the massive resurgence of anti-fed-
eralism which reached its zenith in the Jeffersonian "revolution"
of 1800. But an antithetical development was even then taking
shape, to be nurtured by Marshall's long tenure in the chief jus-
ticeship.
By 1821, when the Marshall court had a clearcut opportunity
to fix certain limits to the extent of the Eleventh Amendment,
the flood-tide of anti-federalism was passing. The experience of
two decades on the bench and three decades of operation of the
federal system in general had matured Marshall's own views;50
straws in the wind were decisions on state limitations and federal
powers such as Hepburn v. Ellzey,51 Bank of the United States
v. Deveaux,52 and Sturges v. Crowninshield.8 In Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, the court, speaking through the Chief Justice, construed
the amendment narrowly, and then proceeded to determine that
a writ of error bringing the case before the Supreme Court does
not commence or prosecute a suit against the state but "acts only
on the record," and preserves the appellant's "constitutional
right to have his defense examined by that tribunal whose prov-
ince it is to construe the Constitution and laws of the Union." 54
Of the amendment itself, Marshall observed:
The first impression made on the mind by this amendment is,
that it was intended for those cases, and for those only, in which
some demand against a state is made by an individual in the
courts of the Union .. .A general interest might well be felt in
leaving to a state the full power of consulting its convenience in
the adjustment of its debts, or of other claims upon it; but no in-
terest could be felt in so changing the relations between the whole
and its parts, as to strip the government of the means of protect-
ing, by the instrumentality of its courts, the Constitution and laws
from active violation. 55
Three years later, in setting aside an Ohio statute authorizing
50. 1 FARRmA 180.
51. 6 US. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805).
52. 9 US. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
53. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); and cf. Dartmouth College Case, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat6 518 (1819).54. 19 U.S.(6 Wheat.) 26, 410.11 (1821).
55. rd. at 407.
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a tax upon the Bank of the United States, the court further re-
fined the suability concept. The Eleventh Amendment "is the
limitation of a power supposed to be granted in the original in-
strument," and this limitation is explicit in the language of the
amendment: "The judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States, by citizens of an-
other state, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign state."56 Where
the state is not a party of record, the action cannot be deemed to
be against the state, said Marshall-a proposition he was compelled
to retract four years later.57 But, insisted Marshall, an action
against a state officer relying upon an unconstitutional grant of au-
thority in a state statute is not inhibited by the Eleventh Amend-
ment.58 In an opinion immediately following, the court further
held that the amendment does not bar a suit against a state bank
corporation,, even where the state is a charter party.59
Even Marshall had to concede that the Eleventh Amendment
insured a state's immunity where the defendant was a state of-
ficial acting within a legal scope of authority.60 Taney, C. J., in,
1857, made this even more explicit by declaring that "[the] sov-
ereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without
its consent and permission; but it may, if it thinks proper, waive
this privilege . . . And as this permission is altogether voluntary
on the part of the sovereignty, it follows that it may prescribe the
terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued, and the
manner in which the suit shall be conducted; and may withdraw
its consent whenever it may suppose that justice to the public re-
quires it."es Nor can the plaintiff avoid the prohibition of the
amendment by making his state the agent for collecting his claim
against another state. 2
The rule with reference to suits against officials of states was
laid down by Harlan, J., in Tindal v. Wesley," on suits against
56. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 850 (1824).
57. Id. at 850-858; and cf. Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 US. (1 Pet.) 110'(1828).
58. Id. at 858-904.
59. Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904
(1824)
60. Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 110 (1828).
61. Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1857), cited by Bradley, J., in Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890).
62. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883). But a state may, under this
amendment, sue for debts assigned to it where the proceeds of the same would
remain with it. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904).
63. 167 U.S. 204 (1897).
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against states the rule of United States v. Lee" on suits against
the United States. In general, as Miller, J., pointed out in the
latter case, the doctrine of sovereignty "is not permitted to inter-
fere with the judicial enforcement of the established rights of
plaintiffs when the United States is not .. .a necessary party to
the suit.' * Similarly, Harlan concluded, the Eleventh Amend-
ment "gives no immunity to officers or agents of a state in with-
holding the property of a citizen without authority of law . ..
If a suit against officers of a state to enjoin them from enforcing
an unconstitutional statute ...be not one against the state, it
is impossible to see how a suit against the same individuals to re-
cover the possession of property belonging to the plaintiff and il-
legally withheld by the defendants can be deemed a suit against
the state." '
The tenor of judicial interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment in the more recent period of American history has been is-
sentially the preservation of state sovereignty within strict circum-
,scription. Thus adjudications since Lee and Tindal have tended
to treat all suits against either state or federal governments as ac-
tions governed both by Article III and the Eleventh Amend-
ment07 Courts have been at pains in this period to distinguish
between mandamus and injunction proceedings as means of con-
trolling the actions of state officials," to be relatively liberal in
assuming jurisdiction over tort actions against state officers, and
to be relatively strict in discouraging tax actions against states.6 '
Finally, the general rule is that consent to be sued in its own
courts does not imply a waiver of immunity from suit in the fed-
eral courts.70
Most recently, of course, the issue of suability and state sover-
eignty has been raised in cases growing out of the school segre-
gation decision in Brown v. Board of Educationi7 where actions
against school boards have been almost uniformly held not to be
actions against the state. The explanation has been relatively tech-
nical: "Full relief can be obtained from the named defendants
64. 106 US. 196 (1883).
65. Id. at 207.
66. Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 222 (1897).
67. Cf. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
68. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
69. Cf. Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918); Creat Northern Life Ins. Co.
v. Read, 332 U.. 47 (1944).
70. Chandler v. Dix, 194 US. 590 (1904).
71. 347 US 483 (1954).- .
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without requiring the state to take any affirmative action."72 As
Parker, Chief Judge for the Fourth Circuit, observed in 1956: "A
state can act only through agents; and whether the agent be an in-
dividual officer or a corporate agency it ceases to represent the state
when it attempts to use state power in violation of the Consti-
tution and may be enjoined from such unconstitutional action."7"
With this trend of judicial thought, the refinement of the right
asserted by the Eleventh Amendment would seem to be virtually
complete. The amendment, historically viewed, represented the
high tide of constitutional accomplishment by the states' rights
school. It is significant that the Twelfth Amendment, adopted in
1803 and culminating the process of limitation upon federal au-
thority begun with the Bill of Rights, was the last amendment
until the Twenty-Second in 1951 to be essentially a restraint upon
federal power, directly or indirectly.74 In the intervening century
and a half, constitutional amendments aimed at strengthening
federalism or at asserting individual rights as against the states.
The following part of this study relates to one of the amend-
ments adopted at another high tide-this time, the high tide of.
the progressive movement-when the times stressed the applica-
tion of the federal power to broad national social objectives.
III. AMENDMENT XVI: ESTABLISHING A FEDERAL
RIGHT
The reorganization of the American federal system resulting
from the Civil War, and occupying the years through the first
Wilson administration, is one of the most significant and familiar
chapters in our national history. Socially and economically, the
United States in the last half of the nineteenth century was chang-
ing from a congeries of sections to a more homogeneous society
increasingly interconnected by communications, transportation
and corporate organization. Constitutionally and politically, it
was shifting from a structure of government in which federal
power was essentially devoted to supervising the relationships
between states, to one in which this power was being called upon
72. Board of Supervisors v. Ludley, 252 F.2d 372, 376 (1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 819, 820 (1958).
73. School Board of Charlotesville v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59, 63 (1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 911 (1957).
74. The Twenty-First Amendment, repealing the Eighteenth, might be con-
sidered as a reduction in federal authority; the peculiar social aspects of prohibi-
tion, however, and the fact that the effect of the latter amendment was to restore
the status quo ante, renders the question moot.
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to deal with economic problems which were not merely interstate
but extra-state-in other words, problems peculiarly and exclu-
sively national.75
In this period of fundamental reorientation, the courts were
caught in a cultural lag which precipitated a renowned series of
cases, in the generation after the Civil War, striking down efforts
to broaden the federal regulatory authority.76 Once more the
original intention of the framers of the Constitution, with respect
to the nature of federal power, became the subject of impassioned
controversy; and in the issue involving the extent of the federal
taxing power there developed an impasse which, like the earlier
question of state sovereignty, was at length to require a clarifying
amendment.
The specific restraints upon the national government expressed
in Article I Section 9-a forerunner, in its way, of The Bill of
Rights as a restraint upon the federal government-presented 'die
knottiest problem in the fourth clause: "No capitation, or other
direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enu-
meration hereinbefore directed to be taken."7 7 It became essen-
tial at the outset to distinguish between "direct" and "indirect"
taxes, Something which, in spite of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller's gen-
erality expressed in 1895, was definitely-not dearly understood in
1787.76
Rufus King, who had demanded of the Philadelphia conven-
tion a definition of direct taxation to which "no one answered,"
told the Massachusetts ratifying convention that the primary pur-
pose of the clause was to insure that representation and taxation
would be apportioned and hence taxation evenly distributed.79
The record of the convention tends to bear out his contention.8 0
Hamilton pointed out that indirect taxes (e. g., "on articles of
consumption") "must for a long time constitute the chief part of
the revenue raised in this country. Those of the direct kind,
which principally relate to land and buildings, must, admit of a
75. Cf. 2 Hocgzrr, op. cit. supra note 38, .chs. 17, 18; 2 WARWN, op. cit. supra
note 15, ch. 25.
76. E.g., Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113 (1877); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Employers' Liability
Cases, 207 US. 463 (1908).
77. Quaere, whether. this clause, from its very wording, was intended to be more
than a temporaryprovision.
78. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 US. 429, 573 (1895); and cf. Mr.
Justice White's elaborate dissent, esp. at 630.
79. 3 FA tAND 255; 2 FAAND 50.
80. 1 FAR.RAN 590-606.
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rule of apportionment. 8s However, the main objective, he agreed,
was to insure a balance between representation and tax liability.82
In 1796, almost precisely a century before the Pollock case, the
question of direct taxes came before the Supreme Court in Hylton
v. United States,88 with Hamilton, as recently retired Secretary of
the Treasury, arguing the case for the government. Mr. Justice
Chase supported the judgment of the original court that the tax
in question, a levy upon carriages, was not a direct tax but one
on use or "expense."
A general power is given to Congress, to lay and collect taxes, of
every kind or nature, without any restraint, except only on ex-
ports; but two rules are prescribed for their government, namely,.
uniformity and apportionment. Three kinds of taxes, to wit, du-
ties, imposts and excises by the first rule, and capitation, or other
direct taxes, by the secondrule.
I believe some taxes may be both direct and indirect at the same
time. If so, would Congress be prohibited from laying such a tax,
because it is partly a direct tax?
The constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as direct taxes,
but only such a Congress could lay in proportion to the census.
The rule of apportionment is only to be adopted in such cases
where it can reasonably apply; and the subject taxed, must ever
determine the application of the rule.
If it is proposed to tax any specific article by the rule of appor-
tionment, and it would evidently create great inequality and in-
justice, it is unreasonable to say, that the Constitution intended
such tax should be laid by that rule. (Emphasis Added.)8 4
Mr. Justice Paterson, a member of the Philadelphia convention,
recalled that "the principal, I will not say, the only, objects that
the framers of the Constitution contemplated as fully within the
rule of apportionment were a capitation re. g., poll] tax and a
tax on land."8r Iredell stressed that "as all direct taxes must be
apportioned, it is evident that the Constitution contemplated
81. THE FEDERALiST No. 21, at 140 (Bourne ed. 1942) (Hamilton).
82. TnE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 235 (Bourne ed. 1942) (Hamilton).
83. 3 US. (3 DalI.) 171 (1796).
84. Id. at 174. To this, Mr. Justice Chase added the comment: "I am inclined to
think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contem-
plated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply,
without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on
land . . ." Id. at 175.
85. Id. at 177. Cf. Paterson's further explanation that the clause was essential
to deal as a practical matter with enumeration of slaves for apportionment pur-
poses. Id. at 177-78. This particular view the court adopted in Springer v. United
States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881).
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none as direct but such as could be apportioned; "8 6 since this levy
could not be so apportioned, he found it not to be a direct tax.
The pragmatic view adopted by the court in the Hylton case
was taken as settled law for ninety-seven years. As the economic
pressures of the Civil War forced Congress to seek additional
sources of revenue, several taxes on income in various forms were
enacted. The chief of these was the Act of June 30, 1864, which
as amended reached to several forms of income, whose taxibility
in turn was upheld by the court-including an insurance com-
pany's receipts from premiums and assessments, S7 an inheritance
tax on realty,8s a levy upon state bank notes,89 and a general tax
upon individual incomes.90 Against the background of this un-
broken line of judicial interpretation extending from Hylton in
1798 to Springer in 1881, Congress in 1894 incorporated in the
Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act a levy upon income derived from real
estate.9 1 In challenging this section of the law, counsel for plain-
tiffs insisted that such a levy was barred by Article I Section 2 and
Section 8 of the Constitution. 2 To adopt such a view would re-
quire the court to upset a long line of firm judicial opinions to
the contrary; doing just this, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller declared
that it was necessary to "correct a century of error." He then said:
The requirement of the Constitution is that no direct tax shall
be laid otherwise than by apportionment. The prohibition is not
against direct taxes on land, from which the implication is sought
that indirect taxes on land would be constitutional, but it is
against all direct taxes, and it is admitted that a tax on real es-
tate is a direct tax. Unless, therefore, a tax upon rents or income
issuing out of lands is intrinsically so different from a tax on the
land itself that it belongs to a wholly different class of taxes, such
taxes must be regarded as falling within the same category as a
tax on real estate eo nomine ....
86. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 181 (1796).
87. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 105, 13 Stat. 276, 283; amended, 14 Stat. 138,
(1866); upheld in Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433 (1869).
88. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §§ 128-50, 13 Stat. 287-94; upheld in Scholey v.
Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1875).
89. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184 § 6, 14 Stat. 146; upheld in Veazie Bank v. Fenno,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
90. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 479; upheld in Springer v. United States,
102 U.S. 586 (1881). In his dissent in the Pollock case, Mr. Justice White enumer-
ated nine statutes levying taxes on income between 1861 and 1870. Cf. 157 U.S.
429, 626 (1895).
91. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, §_27, 28 Stat. 509, 553.
92. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 432 (1895). See the
elaborate list of authorities submitted; by counsel for both sides, on reargument,
158 U.S. 601, 607-17 (1895).
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If it be true that by varying the form the substance may be
changed, it is not easy. to see that anything would remain of the
limitations of the Constitution, or of the rule of taxation and rep-
resentation, so carefully recognized and guarded in favor of the
citizens of each state.98
The court was evenly divided on the first hearing of the case,
Mr. Justice Jackson being unable to particpate because of illness.
Upon reargument, and with a shift in vote by Mr. Justice Shiras,
the entire tax under the statute was held invalid.94 The shock
of the opinion, the 5-4 division of the court, and the delivery a
few months earlier of a ruling narrowly construing the new Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act 95 precipitated a storm of criticism over the
strict (some would say strained) construction of the Constitution. 6
Nine resolutions for an income tax amendment were introduced
in Congress between December, 1895, and the end of 1897; 97 and
between the time of the Pollock opinion and the submission of
the Sixteenth Amendment in 1909, a total of thirty-three propos-
als on the subject came before Congress.'8
The Sixteenth Amendment was introduced at the first session'
of the 61st Congress, and had passed both houses by July 12, 1909.
Within a month, Alabama had ratified it, and on February 3, 1913
three states (Delaware, New Mexico and Wyoming) tied for the
honor of completing the ratification.90 In this same period (1895-
1909) the court itself was retreating steadily from the position
its bare majority had taken in Pollock. There was a distinction,
the court held, between taxes levied "because of ownership" and
those levied upon "privileges" of ownership.100 Under the latter
heading, however much the Pollock rule might make them re-
semble taxes under the former heading, the court found it possi-
ble to place taxes on sales on business exchanges,10 1 inheritance
or succession taxes,102 a tax on manufactured tobacco in the hands
93. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 US. 429, 580-81 (1895). Cf. the
dissent of Harlan, J., on reargument, 158 U.S. 601, 639 (1895), stating that the
Fuller opinion for the majority is "a judicial amendment to the Constitution."
94. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 US. 601 (1895). Cf. Fuller, C.J.
at 635: "If it be true that the Constitution should have been so framed that a tax
of this kind could be laid, the instrument defines the way for its amendment."
95. United States v. Knight, 156 US. 1 (1895).
96. 2 WARREN, SUPREME COURT IN UNrrE STATES HIsToRY 702 (1922).
97. MusuANNo, PRoPosa AMENDMENTS To ma CONsTITUrION 211. (1929).
98. Id. at 212.
99. Secretary of State Knox certified ratification on Feburary 25, 1913.
100. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 US. 41, 80 (1900).
101. Nicol v. Ames, 173 US. 509 (1899).
102. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 US. 41 (1900).
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of a dealer which had already been subjected to a manufacturer's
excise tax,103 a stamp tax on sales of stock certificates,1 04 a special
tax on the business of refining sugar,105 and finally, an income tax
on the privilege of doing business as a corporation.10'
By 1911, with the amendment already before the states and
within a few months of ratification, the court found it possible to
uphold the corporation income tax as an excise because it was
imposed upon "business done in a corporate capacity," distin-
guishable from the kind of income tax which was "direct" be-
cause the latter "was imposed upon property merely because of its
ownership."10 7 This, the same theme which had been sounded in
the Knowlton case, came very close to reducing the Pollock rule
to bankruptcy, or at least to creating a strong suspicion that with
the Sixteenth Amendment becoming momentarily more likely
to be ratified by the necessary majority, the court was engaged in.
a certain degree of "face-saving." This suspicion was not allay d
by the judicial reaction soon after completion of ratification. As
in the case of the Eleventh Amendment, the court found an early
opportunity to comment upon the new constitutional provision
and to concede that it specifically reversed all points of the Pollock
case. In a passage which is a remarkable example of obfuscation,
Chief Justice White said:
[There] is no escape from the conclusion that the Amendment
was drawn for the purpose of doing away for the future with the
principle upon which the Pollock case was decided, that is, of de-
termining whether a tax on income was direct not by a considera-
tion of the burden placed on the taxed income upon which it di-
rectly operated, but by taking into view the burden which re-
sulted on the property from which the income was derived, since
in express terms the Amendment provides that income taxes, from
whatever source the income may be derived, shall not be subject
to the regulation of apportionment. From this in substance it
indisputably arises, first, that all the contentions . . . concerning
the assumed limitations as to the nature and character of income
taxes . . . are in irreconcilable conflict with the very purpose
which the Amendment was adopted to accomplish. Second, that
the contention that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a
direct tax although it is relieved from apportionment ... is
103. Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608 (1902).
104. Thomas v. United States, 192 US. 363 (1904).
105. Spreckel's Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904).
106. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
107. Id. at 150.
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also wholly without foundation since . . . the Amendment...
forbids the application to such taxes of the rule applied in the
Pollock case by which alone such taxes were removed from the
great class of excises, duties and imposts subject to the rule of uni-
formity and were placed under the other or direct class.108
However, just as the judicial concession in the Hollingsworth
case was followed by a gradual restatement of limitations upon
state sovereignty under the Eleventh Amendment,10 9 so the Six-
teenth Amendment was to undergo subsequent interpretative
refinements. The major step in this instance was taken in Eisner
v. Macomber."0 In this case, Mr. Justice Pitney took pains to re-
verse the sweeping concession of White in Brushaber, that the
Sixteenth Amendment restored income taxation to "the category
of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged." Instead, it
was now held, the amendment merely removed the apportion-
ment rule from direct taxes on income, and the key to constitu-
tionality, declared Pitney, now became the definition of "income"
rather than the historic distinction between direct and indirect
taxes. Under this rule, "the essential matter" is that income is"
"a gain, or profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding
from the property, severed from the capital ... received or drawn
by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and
disposal." Where the subject of the tax is mere growth or incre-
ment of value in a capital investment, it is not income taxable
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment."' The amend-
ment, said the 5-4 majority, "applies to income only, and what
is called the stockholders' share in the accumulated profits of the
company is capital. 1 12
The Macomber rule is a striking illustration (recalling the ear-
lier judicial attitude with respect to the Eleventh Amendment)
of the opportunities for reducing the impact of a constitutional
amendment, particularly one which overturns a judicial posi-
tion.113 However, there are obvious limits to the extent to which
courts can read subtle refinements into the language of an amend-
108. Brushaber v. Union Pac. Ry., 240 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1916). See also, Billings v.
United States, 232 U.S. 261 (1914); and the extension of the liberal interpretation
in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921), and in Bromley v. McCaughn,
289 U.S. 124 (1929).
109. Supra notes 51-62.
110. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
111. Id. at 207-08.
112. Id. at 219. Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent at 219, and the detailed dissent
of Mr. Justice Brandies, esp. at 220, 226, 233-37.
113. Supra notes 51-59.
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ment; and the amendment itself tends to limit the range of ju-
dicial pronouncement upon the specific subject. Thus, although
the court has declined to retreat completely'from the Macomber
rule,114 it has certainly not enlarged upon it. Macomber dealt
with a stock dividend, which Pitney held to be capital until sold
or converted; but the same court, a year later, treated as taxable
income a dividend of stock in a new corporation to which the old
corporation had transferred all its assets.115
Not the niceties of tax law, but the court's attitude toward the
controls implicit in the Sixteenth Amendment is in point here.
As Mr. Justice Stone was to point out in 1932, the touchstone of
the taxing power of Congress is the constitutional stipulation
found in the amendment vis-i-vis the general tax provisions of
Article I Sections 7-9: "Congress, having constitutional power to
tax [income], and having established a policy of taxing it, may
choose the moment of its realization and the amount realized"
for the exercise of its power.116 Whatever the disposition of
the courts to set bounds to the language of the amendment,
Stone's enuciation of this broad concept of plenary authority
within the language seems to have assured the attainment of the
amendment's primary objective-to bar the road back to the
Pollock theory.
IV. CHANGING THE CLIMATE OF JUDICIAL OPINION
The Wilson administration of 1913-17 rode the high tide of the
progressive movement which had begun with the Populists and
had attained its first great national goals in the administration
of Theodore Roosevelt. Popular election of senators, the federal
income tax, national prohibition and universal woman's suffrage
were written into the Constitution in quick succession as the
groundswell of reform continued. 1" In addition, various statu-
tory branches of progressivism were enacted under the New Free-
dom: the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was supp-emented by the
Clayton Act, in an effort to counteract judicial construction which
had narrowed the benefits of the earlier law; the Federal Reserve
System and the Federal Trade Commission were created; and,
114. Cf. Helveringv. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943).
115. United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
116. McLaughlin v. Alliance Ins. Co., 286 U.S. 244, 250 (1932).
117. The Sixteenth Amendment, of course, had been passed by Congress and
ratified by the states during the Taft administration.
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in the Act of September 1, 1916,118 shipment in interstate com-
merce of goods manufactured with child labor was prohibited.
But the continuing cultural lag in the judiciary, gaining
strength from the reaction against reform in the period immedi-
ately following the first World War, brought much of* the Wilson
legislative program to grief.119 Most emphatically was this dem-
onstrated in Hammer v. Dagenhart120 decided in 1918; the man-
power pinch of the war, and the slowing of the reform movement
as national energies were diverted to the military effort, enhanced
the conservative argument: commerce itself is subject to regulation
under the Constitution, not the manufacture of goods before
being put in transit; child labor was an incident of manufacture
and hence a local problem. "To uphold the act upon the theory
of police power it must be clear that interstate commerce is men-
aced and not something else outside that domain."121 By a 5-4
majority, Mr. Justice Day for the court accepted this line of rea-
soning.'"
The Congressional reaction to this opinion was reflected in
two resolutions for amendment in the first session of the 67th.
Congress. 23 Two years later, the movement had gathered the
necessary momentum; and an elaborate report, submitted by the
majority of the House Committee on the Judiciary, buttressed the
argument for an overriding constitutional enactment with de-
tailed information from the 1920 census on the extent of child
labor in the national economy.124 By June 3, 1924 the amend-
ment had passed both houses and was referred to the Secretary
of State for submission to the states.125 Its provisions were per-
haps ineptly phrased; in any case, there were words which were
not calculated to allay the ever-present and ever-sensitive tradi-
tions of state sovereignty:
118. 39 Stat. 675, ch. 432 (1916).
119. Other Statutes of the progressive era found unconstitutional by the Su-
preme Court included the War Revenue Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 302, 1075 (excess
rofits tax), as repealed by the Act of February 24. 1919, 40 Stat. 1075, struck down
yBurnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 593 (1952); the Act of Sept. 19, 1918,
ch. 174, 40 Stat. 960 (wages and hours of women in District of Columbia), set aside
in Adkins v. Children's Hosital, 261 US. 525 1923) the Child Labor Tax Act
of 1919, tit. lI, 40 Stat. 1138, invalidated by Baley v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U.S. 20 (1922): and the Lever Fair Trade Act of 1919, ch. 80 § 2, 41 Stat. 298, set
aside by United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 US. 81 (1921).
120. 247 US. 251 (1918).
121. Id. at 263 (argument for appelle).
122. Id. at 275; 4. the dissent of Holmes, J. at 277.
123. 61 CoNG. REc. 100 (1921). As early as 1914, an amendment relating to labor
of women and children had been proposed. Cf. MUSMANNO, op. cit. supra note 97,
at 137-45.
124. Cf. H.R. Rep. 395,68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925).
125. 65 CoNG. REC. 10139-40 (1924).
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1. The Congress shall have power to limit, regulate, and prohibit
the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.
2. The power of the several states is unimpaired by this article ex-
cept that the operation of state laws shall be suspended to the ex-
tent necessary to give effect to legislation enacted by the Con-
gress.'"
The reasons for the wording of Section 2 of the "proposed Twen-
tieth Amendment" were varied; at best, it was vague and in the
nature of a policy statement rather than a specific constitutional
provision.127 However this might be, the proposal appeared on
the American scene at a highly inauspicious time. It was the "'hey-
day" of normalcy, when the "Golden Twenties" displayed their
greatest glitter. If the amendment was to be understood to be a
bid 'to overturn an existing judicial rule, in the manner of the
Eleventh and Sixteenth Amendments, its poor showing before the
states upon ratification can only be attributed to a general public
apathy with reference to the question, or perhaps even a distinct
trend in local political sentiment in favor of the Dagenhart ma-
jority opinion. Within seven months after its submission to the
states, the amendment had been rejected by thirteen legislatures.
Aside from the question of national attitude toward child labor,
two problems presented themselves as an outgrowth of this devel-
opment: (I) Did the action of thirteen states (that is, one more
than enough to block the necessary three-fourths majority of the
then forty-eight states) automatically defeat ratification? (2) If
not, and if one or more states might later reverse their vote, how
long could an amendment reasonably be expected to remain be-
fore the states for action?128
These questions, while interesting aspects of constitutional the-
ory, are only pertinent to this study insofar as they affected the
continuing effort to override the rule in the Dagenhart and Drexel
Furniture cases. In the absence of a stipulated time limit for be-
coming operative,12' the amendment continued to remain before
126. H.R.J. Res. 184, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
127. Cf. MUSMANNO, op. cit. supra note 97, at 129-44. Only five amendments of
the twenty-seven which had eventually been submitted to the states have failed of
ratification; two in 1789-91, on details of representation; one in 1810-12 on loss of
citizenship; one in 1861-62 on protection of slavery; and the child labor amend-
ment of 124.37.
128. On a reasonable time for consideration of an amendment, see Dillon v.
Gloss, 256 US. 868 (1921), this view, however, was specifically rejected by the
court in Coleman v. Miller, 307 US. 433 (1939).
129. The Eighteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-First and Twenty-Second Amend-
ments each provded a seven-year limit for state action on ratification.
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the states, until by 1937, twenty-eight states had ratified it (includ-
ing ten which reversed their former vote against ratification) and
eleven stood on record as rejecting it, while three others had sim-
ply recorded a refusal to ratify.130 At that point, this state of af-
fairs prompted one state court to assert that the amendment was
no longer open to ratification inasmuch as (1) it had failed of ac-
ceptance by more than one-fourth of the states (counting the
three refusals to ratify as equivalent to rejection), (2) when more
than one-fourth were thus on record as rejecting, the other states
were estopped from reconsidering their action (a proposition
which could not be true in 1937, if it were not true in 1925, when
the original one-fourth-plus-one opposition was first registered);
and (3) the thirteen years which had elapsed since the original
submission to the states exceeded any reasonable time limit.181
However, in the same year another state court came to exactly an
opposite conclusion.1 32 Inasmuch as the Supreme Court declines
to leave the final settlement of a constutional question to state
tribunals, it accepted jurisdiction in the Coleman case. In the 7-2
majority opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking through.
Mr. Justice Stone, declared:
When a proposed amendment springs from a conception of eco-
nomic needs, it would be necessary, in determining whether a rea-
sonable time had elapsed since its submission, to consider the eco-
nomic conditions prevailing in the country, whether these had so
far changed since the submission as to make the proposal no
longer responsive to the conceptions which inspired it or whether
conditions were such as to intensify the feeling of need and the ap-
propriateness of the proposed remedial action. In short, the ques-
tion of a reasonable time in many cases would involve, as in this
case it does involve, an appraisal of a great variety of relevant con-
ditions, political, social and economic, which can hardly be said
to be within the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a
court of justice .... On the other hand, these conditions are ap-
propriate for the consideration of the political departments of the
Government. The questions they involve . . . can be decided by
the Congress with the full knowledge and appreciation ascribed
to the national legislature of the political, social and economic
130. See the "Chronology of the Child Labor Amendment!' in Coleman v.
Miller, 307 US. 433, 473 (1939). See also the court's review of the ratification and
rejection problems in relation to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments; Id.
at 448-51.
131. Wise v. Chandler, 270 Ky. 1, 108 S.W.2d 1024 (1937), cert. denied, 307 U.S.
474 (1939).
132. Coleman v. Miller, 146 Kan. 390, 71 P.2d 518 (1937).
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conditions which have prevailed during the period since the sub-
mission of the amendment. 1 s
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Black declared that the
Constitution gave Congress "exclusive power to control submis-
sion of constitutional amendments;" Congress is subject to nojudicial review in this matter, and "the views of any court upon
this process cannot be binding upon Congress." 84
The Coleman case bears a relationship to the proposed child
labor amendment roughly analogous to the relationship of Flint
v. Stone Tracy Co. in .1911, to the impending ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment in 1913,135 with the fundamental distinc-
tion, of course, that the child labor proposal was not to attain
final ratification. Both Coleman and Flint were in essence the
shadows cast before a coming event, in this instance, the reversal
of the Dagenhart rule two years later. The court which spoke
so generously of Congress' prerogatives in determining upon pol-
icies of submission of constitutional amendments, and which so
conspicuously by-passed the opportunity to apply the coup de
grace to the child labor amendment itself, was a court which had
undergone a massive readjustment in the years immediately pre-
ceding Coleman, from the period of systematic rejection of early
New Deal legislation through the court reorganization struggle
of 1937 to a new majority philosophy.130 Not since the Carter
Coal Co. case,1s7 in the spring of 1936, had a major piece of New
Deal legislation been struck down, and a succession of New Deal
laws had been upheld.188 Soon to come on for review was a statute
in which Congress, recognizing the moribund prospects for the
child labor amendment, had clearly set the stage for a reversal
of the Dagenhart rule. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,189
inter alia, had declared:
Congress hereby finds that the existence, in industries engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, of labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum stand-
133. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54' (1939).
134. Id. at 457, 459.
135. Supra notes 100-109.
136. This familiar phase of constitutional history need not be recapitulated here.
Of interest in this general connection, however, is 2 PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES,
chs. 70, 71 (1952); JACKSON, STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY passim (1941).
137. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
138. Cf. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939), upholding the second Agricultural
Act; and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), upholding the
National Labor Relations Act.
139. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch 676, § 15, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.§ 201 (195).
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ard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being
of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and instrumental-
ities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor:
conditions among the workers of the several states; (2) burdens
commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; ... and (5)
interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in com-
merce. (Emphasis added.)140
Under the following section on definitions, the act dealt in de-
tail with labor by children between the ages of fourteen and
eighteen.14t
In reviewing the constitutionality of the act, Mr. Justice Stone,
for a unanimous court, found that "Hammer v. Dagenhart was-a
departure from the principles which have prevailed in the inter-
pretation of the commerce clause both before and since the de-
cision, and that such vitality, as the precedent, as it then had has
long since been exhausted., It should be and now is 6oveiruled."' 2
Like Pollock, the Dagenhart case had at length entered the limbo
of constitutional obsolescence. 10 In the meantime, the child
labor amendment had quietly died.1 " The overturning of the
former judicial rule had been effected, in this instance, by a statu-
tory proposition enacted with a full consciousness of the changed
climate of judicial opinion. This clear evidence of change was
the key to success; it is worth noting that a Congressional enact-
ment making reference to child labor had been struck down by
the court as late as 1935, when the National Industrial Recovery
Act was held unconstitutional.1 45 The climate of opinion, in this
case general local political opinion, was equally a determining
•factor in the failure of the child labor amendment in the twenties
and thirties.""
In view of the continued rejection of the child labor amend-
ment, even in the "heyday" of the New Deal, it can hardly be
maintained that the proposal presented any threat to which the
140. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 202 (a) (10), (2), (5) (1958).
141. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. 203 (1) (1958).
142. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941).
143. See a series of court decisions leading away from the Dagenhart rule, cited
in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941); compare this with the judicial
retreat from Pollock, supra notes 100-106.
144. Technically and theoretically, each of the five amendments submitted but
never ratified by a three-fourths majority, cited MUSMANNO, op. cit. supra note 97. is
still before the states, with the exception of the amendment of 1861-62 which was
specifically rejected by the Thirteenth Amendment. See, In general, Bunseci, LAw
oF THz AMERICAN CONs TTUON 637 (1922).
145. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 US. 495 (1935).
146. See the "Chronology of the Child Labor Amendment" in Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433, 473 (1939).
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court eventually paid heed. In the case of the income tax, the
trend in. judicial thought had already turned away from the un-
popular rule; the Sixteenth Amendment reflected the trend rather
than directing it. As for the child labor amendment, the deep-
rooted opposition of many states, principally agricultural, made
it practically impossible to utilize this method of reversing the
existing judicial rule. This is not to say that the amendment
method will not continue to serve this particular function, how-
ever, in cases where there is sufficient and determined popular dis-
approval of the position taken by the courts. Under such circum-
stances, ratification of constitutional change is fairly expedi-
tious.147 Proposed amendments have sometimes been attacked
on the ground that their subject-matter was:not properly the prov-
ince of the federal government;14 8 it is fairly well settled, however,
that by the act of ratification the people of the United States.de-
liberately place the subject-matter in the federal domain.24 Some-
times, too, as in the case of Darby, the court may ultimately find
that federal competence in the subject-matter already exists.
Madison understood the practical value of the amendment as a
means of correcting mistakes or adapting the national political
organization to problems which might arise in the course of time.
"That useful alterations will be suggested by experience could
not but be foreseen," he wrote. Therefore,
it was requisite .. . that a mode for introducing them should be
provided. The mode preferred by the convention seems to be
stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against
that extreme facility which would render the Constitution too mu-
table, and that extreme difficulty which might perpetuate its dis-
covered faults. It, moreover, equally enables the general and
State governments to originate the amendment of errors, as they
may be pointed out by the experience on the one side or on the
other.150
147. Stone, J., noted the argument of counsel in Coleman v. Miller that "onc
year, six months and thirteen days was the average time used in passing upon
amendments which have been ratified since the first ten amendments; that "three
years, six months and twenty-five days has been the longest time used in ratifying."
307 US. 433, 453; and cf. supra notes 46-48.
148. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920), challenging the Eighteenth
Amendment; Lesser v. Garnett, 259 U.S. 130 (1922), challenging the Nineteenth
Amendment.
149. "But the function of a state legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment
to the Federal Constitution, like the function of Congress in proposing the amend-
ment, is a federal function derived from the federal constitution; and it transcends
any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a state." Brandies, J. in
Lesser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922).
150. Tim FinALisr No. 43, at 301-302 (Bourne ed. 1942) (Madison).
